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Who is the regulator?
The banking regulator in Japan is the Financial Ser-
vices Agency (FSA),which also regulates securities,
insurance and other financial service industries.The
Bank of Japan (BOJ) is the central bank and the
lender of the last resort.The BOJ is not a regulator
but its objectives include “contributing to the main-
tenance of an orderly financial system”.Pursuant to
Article 44 (On-Site Examinations) of the Bank of
Japan Act,1 the BOJ conducts on-site examinations
of financial institutions based on a contract with
them for the purpose of appropriately conducting
or preparing to conduct prudential policy actions
such as emergency loans, for which eligible colla-
teral is not required, as stipulated in Articles 37
through 39.2 Some securities firms operating in
Japan, Japanese firms as well as the security affili-
ates of overseas investment banks have a current
account with the BOJ and access the discount win-
dow, with the BOJ conducting on-site examinations
of them. In 1965, the BOJ extended an emergency
loan for a large securities company, and did this
again in 1997.
Until 1998, it was the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
that was responsible for bank regulation. In 1998, in
the midst of the financial crisis, the Long-Term
Credit Bank of Japan (now the Shinsei Bank) and
the Nippon Credit Bank (now the Aozora Bank)
were de facto nationalized or “placed under special
public management”, in Japanese regulators’ jargon.
These banks were too large and complex to fail, and
the above action was taken in light of “systemic
risk”. At this time, however, Japan had not devel-
oped a permanent legal framework for “systemic
risk exception” and the Diet, the Japanese legisla-
ture, had to work very hurriedly on the emergency
legislations. Later in 2000, the “systemic risk excep-
tion” clause was made permanent by adding neces-
sary language to the Deposit Insurance Law.
The time was then more than ripe for a major over-
haul and strengthening of the regulatory structure,
and the regulatory power was placed with the newly
established FSA. The MOF is now responsible for
financial stability issues, from the viewpoint of fiscal
soundness.
FSA and the financial crisis
It is only natural that the crisis Japan experienced in
the late 1990s and early 2000s was very Japanese in
its nature,its cause and the way in which it was over-
come.
Japanese households hold approximately half of
their financial assets in deposits, compared to about
one eighth in the United States and about a third in
Germany and France.Depository institutions are the
primary channel of flow of funds in Japan, and the
deterioration of their asset quality placed an enor-
mous burden on Japan’s economy.
The deflationary economic environment made the
situation even worse.The deflation of the late 1990s
through the early 2000s added to the problem be-
cause the value of collateral real estate kept falling.
The BOJ kept interest rates very low but was faced
with the zero boundary of nominal interest rates.The
BOJ’s policy rate was reduced to 0.5 percent as early
as 1995, reached zero in 1999 and started rising in
2006, but in July 2008 it was still 0.5 percent.
How did Japan’s financial system overcome the cri-
sis within a deflationary environment? How was the
FSA able to resolve the problems of dozens of small-
er institutions as well as those of a few very large
ones, failures of which could have caused global
financial panic?
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Smooth Settlement of Funds).The whole policy toolkit had to be put to use. In
1996, a new set of rules tailored for expeditiously
resolving financial institutions was enacted by the
Diet. “Prompt corrective action” was given more
concrete and numerical indicators on the need for
such action.The Diet also enacted a blanket guaran-
tee for five years of deposits as well as all other lia-
bilities of financial institutions. The Deposit
Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) provided
financial assistance to the assuming institutions
including 18.6 trillion yen in grants.3
In planning and conducting these policies of resolu-
tion, Japan learned many lessons from the experi-
ence of the United States.Japan also shared with the
United States the experience of asking taxpayers for
funds to protect the stability of the financial system.
More than ten trillion yen was paid by the taxpayers
and the rest by the surviving financial institutions
through the deposit insurance system. Japanese tax-
payers also provided an explicit guarantee for the
borrowings by the DICJ to finance its operations for
resolutions with the financial assistances and for cap-
ital injections.The BOJ provided the DICJ a signifi-
cant liquidity support.
In order to stabilize the financial system and revital-
ize the economy,capital injection of a significant vol-
ume was much needed. As far as capital injection is
concerned, however, there was less experience from
overseas in recent history to learn from. Japanese
authorities injected 12.4 trillion yen4 into the banks
through purchasing preferred or common stocks and
extending subordinated loans. In the two cases of
2003, the systemic risk exception clause in the
Deposit Insurance Law was activated. The above
amounts of money are certainly very large and could
be compared with Japan’s nominal GDP, which is
approximately 500 trillion yen.
In parallel with these actions, the FSA conducted
several rounds of “special inspections” of major
banks from 2001 to 2004 to accelerate the process of
identifying the bad assets and the disposal thereof.
The most important outcome of these measures was
the acceleration of the disposal of bad assets and the
resultant improvement of asset quality of the finan-
cial institutions. The non-performing loans (NPLs)
based on the Financial Reconstruction Law reached
a peak of 43.2 trillion yen or 8.4 percent of the total
credit for “all banks” at the end March 2002 but
came down to as far as 11.9 trillion yen or 2.5 percent
as of September 2007. 5
For the first few years of its history, the FSA had to
walk a tightrope, taking a number of emergency
actions that have led to the relative stability of
Japan’s financial system in the recent years.
Financial regulation after the crisis
The emergency nature of bank regulation in Japan is
now being “unwound” to one corresponding to
“peace time.”The blanket guarantee of deposits was
removed in 2002 and 2005 in two steps.A majority of
the capital injected into the major banks has been
collected.Ashikaga Bank,a large regional bank with
more than 4 trillion yen of deposits that was nation-
alized in 2003, was denationalized this year.
Fortunately, Japanese financial institutions were not
much involved in the subprime mortgage and other
credit bubbles in recent years, partly because their
business is less dependent on an “originate and dis-
tribute” model.A recent FSA release shows that the
exposure and the related losses on the sub-prime
mortgage related products of Japanese financial
institutions are not small but a systemic disruption is
not likely.6
What the financial regulator of Japan needs to do
now is not near-term crisis management but a mid-
to long-term remaking of the regulatory framework
through developing a new way of communication
with the regulated institutions.
Throughout the recent years,dominated by the reso-
lution of failed banks and “special inspections,”com-
munication between the FSA and the regulated
institutions tended to be the one between the FSA
on the offensive and the financial institutions on the
defensive.It is a shared view among the banking reg-
ulators in many countries that, in order to make the
regulatory framework forward looking and pre-emp-
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tive,the regulators must be well informed of the cur-
rent developments in the industry to maintain the
stability of financial system.
Change of tone at the FSA
A look at the English website of the FSA reveals a
small change. While the website carries only five
speeches in English by senior FSA officials for the
six years from 2000 to 2005, for the one and a half
years from 2007 to July 2008 there are seven speech-
es. This increase could imply that the FSA wants to
disseminate something to an overseas audience, but
what? Looking at the FSA’s Japanese website, two
issues given top attention are ‘”Strengthening the
Competitiveness of Japan’s Financial and Capital
Markets”’ and “Better Regulation”.
It is not surprising that the FSA of Japan works
hard to make the Tokyo market stronger and more
competitive. The Tokyo market is not exercising
its potential to its fullest extent. It should prepare
a better environment so that the Japanese financial
industry can better serve its customers by more
efficiently providing the household sector with
better access to investment opportunity and the
corporate sector with funds for further growth, at
the same time making settlement services more
and more efficient and reliable. Once the Tokyo
market is better able to serve its domestic custo-
mers,it will also offer the Asian region a more effi-
cient financial infrastructure, which will lead to a
win-win situation for Tokyo and other financial
markets in the region.
As for “better regulation”,which is a very important
element of the initiative to make the Tokyo market
more competitive, it is not clear that the FSA claims
that the phrase “better regulation”is their invention,
but thought should be given why they describe their
policy initiative using a foreign phrase of possibly
British origin.
Many regulators around the world are of the view
that the three objectives of financial regulation are
financial stability, customer protection, and market
integrity. With these objectives in mind, the FSA
states that the four pillars of “better regulation”
are 1) the optimal combination of rules-based and
principles-based supervisory approaches, 2) prompt
and effective responses to high-priority issues, 3) the
encouragement of voluntary efforts by financial
institutions, and the placing of greater emphasis on
incentives for them, and 4) improving the trans-
parency and predictability of regulatory actions.
Financial regulation by the Ministry of Finance
before the establishment of the FSA was criticized
for being non-transparent, too close to industry and
too discretionary.The FSA from its inception had to
demonstrate that it was transparent, adequately dis-
tanced from the industry and working to the written
rules rather than unwritten practices,while clarifying
the criteria for their actions so as to make them more
predictable.
For some time in the recent past,“discretionary”, in
the financial community of Japan, had the connota-
tion of “lacking in transparency and predictability”.
With this background, the first pillar of “the optimal
combination of rules-based and principles-based
supervisory approaches” is of much importance, be-
cause a “principles-based” supervisory approach im-
plies that, based on a certain set of principles, the
financial institutions and the FSA are to agree on a
judgment for each case through applying relevant
principles and taking into account specific elements
of the case. This process does not work well if me-
chanical objectivity is rigorously required.Therefore,
this approach will require some exercise of discre-
tion in a transparent manner.
Constant dialogue between the FSA and industry
will be a prerequisite in order for this approach to
work.The flow of information must be two-way. On
the one end of the flow is the FSA,but who is on the
other end? For a regulatory framework to be “prin-
ciples-based”, individual players in the market have
to be able to make their own judgment as to what to
do or not to do.In this context,self-regulatory organ-
isations (SROs) could play a greater role, because
SROs could function as the forum where individual
players get together with the latest information on
what is taking place in the market to discuss how to
help their members make a right judgment to pro-
tect their customers and maintain market integrity.
The role to be played by SROs will differ from coun-
try to country,but the necessary scope of self-regula-
tion needs to be secured in a manner best fit for the
country.
From this point of view, “better regulation” means
“better collaboration”between the regulator and the
regulated. In other words, “better regulation”
requires “better self-regulation.”Challenges ahead
Recent residential mortgage-related episodes in the
United States and some of the EU countries since
the summer of 2007 illustrate the importance for a
regulatory framework to be able to promptly res-
pond to ever changing business models of financial
intermediation, which keep on causing ever chang-
ing problems.
Unfortunately, we cannot assume that all the prob-
lems are always detected and corrected early
enough, which implies that there will be a situation
in which some larger and/or more complex institu-
tions encounter serious problems through misman-
agement of their risks. A regulatory framework will
not be complete without an effective legal and insti-
tutional framework to allow those players to fail and
exit the market in an orderly manner.
The more players are too large and/or complex to fail,
the more moral hazard will be with us.With an effec-
tive structure to allow those who are not viable to fail
without disruption, there will be a smaller number of
too large and/or complex institutions and moral haz-
ard will accordingly be reduced.In this context,a reg-
ulatory framework will be better if it is equipped with
a more usable tool kit for resolution of large and/or
complex institutions without systemic disruption.
When faced with a potential financial crisis, all the
safety-net players are required to collaborate very
closely.For this to happen,the regulatory framework
has to be such that allows for a constant flow of
information among the players so that their capabil-
ities are readily mobilized as soon as the need arises.
Each country has its own way of distributing respon-
sibility among the safety net players, depending on
the history of financial regulation and the structure
of the financial industry. We have recently seen, on
both sides of the Atlantic, two sets of proposals of a
major reform on the roles of safety-net players being
presented in order to quell a potential threat to the
stability of financial system.
In July 2008, the UK authorities proposed a regula-
tory reform by publishing “Financial Stability and
Depositor Protection: Further Consultation”, in
which a “special resolution regime” is offered as a
legal and institutional regime that is tailor-made for
resolution of financial institutions. The tools pro-
posed in the new regime will include a transfer of
part or all of the failing bank to a private sector third
party or a publicly-controlled bridge bank, a new
bank insolvency procedure,the power to take a bank
into temporary public sector ownership and so on.
Japan has developed a similar regime that allows a
transfer of part or all of the failing bank, “special
public management” or “bridge bank” over the
course of crisis and has used them in many resolu-
tions of failed institutions that were large/small or
complex/simple.
The proposed reform in the UK includes a recom-
mendation on the roles and collaboration among the
FSA,the Bank of England (BOE) and HM Treasury.
Under the proposed regime,the FSA will initiate the
resolution process, and the BOE will be responsible
for deciding which resolution tool to use and the
operation thereof. The Chancellor of Exchequer
would authorize a BOE decision requiring the use of
funds for which the Chancellor is responsible.
It is worth noting that the BOE is to work as the
operator of the SRR.In Japan and the United States,
the deposit insurer plays the role assigned to the
BOE. In Japan, the DICJ determines the method of
the resolution and obtains an approval from the FSA
and the Ministry of Finance, and works as the oper-
ator of the resolution. The DICJ used to be a very
small institution at its inception in 1971.However,as
a wave of bank failures became reality in the mid-
1990s and new responsibilities as the operator of a
wider range of resolution tools were given to it, a
rapid expansion of the DICJ followed.
In the US,it is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) that determines the method for reso-
lution and implements it. During the peak years of
resolutions of the thrift institutions for several years
around 1990, the Resolution and Trust Corporation
(RTC) was established on a temporary basis and it
successfully expedited the clean-up of the US finan-
cial system.The FDIC was founded in 1933 and has
been a large institution working as the operator of
resolutions for decades.
As for the US proposal,the Department of the Trea-
sury published “Blueprint for a Modernized Finan-
cial Regulatory Structure”in March 2008.This docu-
ment offers three sets of recommendations. One is
for the short term, another for the intermediate
term. The third is “optimal” or for the long term, in
which the Federal Reserve is chosen as “market sta-
bility regulator” with broad powers focusing on the
overall financial system.
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The United States has had a legal and institutional
framework for resolution of depository institutions
for a long time. After the years of the savings and
loan crisis in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the
US financial system restored stability in the mid-
1990s, which lasted for about ten years until the sub-
prime mortgage market started sending disturbing
signals. In 2005 and 2006, or the final two years
towards the end of the stable period,there was not a
single bank failure in the United States. But in those
years, however, the subprime and other credit bub-
bles were quietly expanding only to burst in 2007. In
July 2008, we saw the failure of IndyMAC, the third
largest in US history.
As was the case with Japan in the 1980s, the mone-
tary environment contributed to the problem and it
is hard to deny that there was a delay in recognition
of the problem by the US authorities.7 Even if they
had detected the problem at an early stage, would it
have been possible to prevent the problem from
growing with monetary tightening? Mr. Allan
Greenspan wrote,: “Even if the Fed were to decide
there was a stock bubble and we wanted to let the air
out of it, would we be able to? … I was reasonably
certain that seeking to defuse a mounting bubble
with incremental tightening, as many had recom-
mended, would be counterproductive. … I decided
that the best the Fed could do would be to stay with
our central goal of stabilizing product and services
prices.”8 I expect that there will be more than a few
plausible arguments that monetary policy and pru-
dential supervision could do something to prevent a
bubble and its bursting. It will be interesting to see
how the discussion continues and plays out.
From the viewpoint of designing a regulatory frame-
work, it would be constructive not to seek a correct
answer that will hold for many years but to ensure
that our regulatory structure evolves along with the
financial industry so as to better achieve the three
objectives of financial stability, customer protection
and market integrity. In this regard, the recent expe-
riences of the bubbles might suggest that we need to
have a better understanding of and an insight into
the financial innovations taking place in the financial
markets where a wider range of financial firms inter-
act. Central banks often have better access to and
more hands-on knowledge on the financial markets
than other safety-net players, but the recent record
of their performance in detecting a future threat has
not been particularly encouraging. As the UK and
the US are considering additional or new prudential
responsibility of the central bank,the prudential role
of a central bank might be the focus of a discussion
on the distribution of responsibility among the safe-
ty-net players.
The Japanese financial system is currently relatively
stable, but this is no time for complacency. Rather,
for Japanese safety-net players, it is time for an
“unprejudiced” review of the way they work, which
is indeed the most difficult challenge ahead.
7 Henry M.Paulson,the Secretary of Treasury of the US,said in his
remarks of March 2008 of “Optimal Model” in “Blueprint,” “A
major advantage of this structure is its timelessness and its flexibil-
ity.”
8 Pages 200 and 201 of his recent book “The Age of Turbulence”
(The Penguin Press).